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Abstract: No consensus exists on the causal mechanisms underpinning declining voting based on 
social cleavages – religion and class – in Europe. Previous research has emphasized two main factors: 
social change within the electorate (bottom-up) and parties’ policy polarization (top-down). This 
article presents a third level of analysis that links parties and cleavage-related social organizations, 
producing a factor capable of reinforcing group identity and interest representation. This hypothesis is 
tested for Italy in 1968–2008, where changes in the party system provided a natural experiment to 
assess the impact of changing structural alternatives at the party–organizational level. The level of 
cleavage voting in Italy then responded primarily to changes in the structure of party–organization 
linkages, while the impact of policy mobilization and social change was negligible. 
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According to research on ‘the decline of cleavage politics’, parties and their electorates have 
changed in contemporary democracies. Voters have become more independent from 
traditional forms of group allegiances, while mass-based parties have been replaced first by 
catch-all parties, and then by electoral/cartel parties.1 This body of work challenges a 
longstanding tradition which regards class, religion and territory as the basis for the 
‘insulation’ of voters in opposing camps brought about by parties,2 through a kind of ‘social 
closure’,3 which, mainly in Western Europe, eventually led to the ‘encapsulation’4 of voters in 
distinct political enclaves and sub-cultures. 
Although the empirical support for this thesis on the decline of cleavage politics is still 
a matter of some debate, more important is the fact that no shared consensus exists on the 
causal mechanisms underpinning and conditioning this process.5 Previous research on the 
                                                 
 1 See, respectively, Russell J. Dalton, ‘Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies’, Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 264–84;  Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western 
European Party Systems’, in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds, Political Parties and Political 
Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966) 177-200; Richard Katz and Peter Mair, 
‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party 
Politics, 1 (1995) 5–28. 
 2 Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An 
Introduction’, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross- 
National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967) 1- 64.  
 3 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of 
European Electorates 1885–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 4 Stefano Bartolini, The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980. The Class Cleavage 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 5 See Geoffrey Evans, ed., The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). See also Martin Elff, ‘Social Structure and Electoral Behavior in Comparative 
Perspective: The Decline of Social Cleavages in Western Europe Revisited’, Perspectives on Politics, 2 (2007), 
277–94. 
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decline of cleavages in Western party systems has tended to fall into one of two camps: those 
that privilege social structural factors and those that emphasize political factors. The former – 
which have dominated the literature – highlight the primacy of changes in the social 
composition of the electorate and can be considered a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the structuring 
of political divisions. The latter, by contrast, argues that cleavage allegiances derive from the 
strategies of parties themselves and can be characterized as ‘top-down’ in nature. 
The bottom-up approach argues that changes that have occurred within the electorate, 
such as rising living standards, the spread of affluence and the expansion of higher education, 
have increased the cognitive capacity of voters, making them more individualistic in their 
voting choices.6 Accordingly, social mobility and the emergence of new issues have produced 
pressures on voters which undermine the salience of traditional group identities,7 and the 
increasing secularization of the electorate has similarly weakened the religious base of voting 
behaviour.8 Moreover, new divisions among the electorates are thought to have emerged 
along cultural and value dimensions,9 supposedly undermining the hold of traditional 
cleavage politics.10 This ‘modernization thesis’ therefore posits that there has been gradual 
                                                 
 6 Dalton, ‘Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment’; Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion 
and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies (London, Chatham House Publishers, 2002). 
 7 See, for example, Mark N. Franklin, ‘The Decline of Cleavage Politics’, in Mark N. Franklin, Tom Mackie 
and Henry Valen, eds, Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western 
Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 383 - 405  ; Mark N. Franklin, The Decline of Class 
Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964–1983. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 
 8 David Brougthon and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds, Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe 
(London: Routledge, 2000). 
 9 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Wlezel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
10 Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘The Transformation of Cleavage Politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture’, European 
Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 165–85. 
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erosion in the political salience of cleavages over time, and that this decline in cleavage 
politics ‘can be regarded as the consequence of the successful resolution by political systems 
of deep-seated conflicts of social interests’.11 
By contrast, the top-down approach has tended to focus on elite mobilization 
strategies, and according to this approach the electoral salience of traditional cleavages is a 
response to changes in the supply side of party policies.12 With respect to social class, there is 
a substantial literature relating class voting to economic policy preferences.13 The working 
class prefers redistribution and so votes for parties on the left, whereas the middle class tries 
to resist these claims and so votes for parties on the right. Accordingly, the degree to which 
parties differ in their economic policies in this regard is thought to influence the degree to 
which different classes support them. This assumption provides the backbone for studies 
which seek to explain class voting in relation to party positions. So, if parties differ in their 
policy outlook along dimensions strongly related to the cleavages, we would expect the 
salience, or strength, of these cleavages to be stronger than if the parties stand for much the 
                                                 
11 Cees van der Eijk, Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie and Henry Valen, ‘Cleavages, Conflict Resolution and 
Democracy’, in Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie and Henry Valen, eds, Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving 
Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 406-
431.   
12 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Alla Ricerca della Sociologia Politica’, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 4 (1968), 597–639; 
Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994).  
13 Seymour M. Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen H. Barton and Juan J. Linz, J, ‘The Psychology of Voting: An 
Analysis of Political Behaviour’, in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley, 1954) 1124-1175.; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore, 
Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); Douglas A. Hibbs Jr, ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic 
Policy’, American Political Science Review, 71 (1971), 1467–87. 
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same policy outlook.14 This perspective recognizes the autonomous role of parties as the main 
players in attenuating or reinforcing traditional cleavages, and although empirical tests of this 
hypothesis have provided somewhat mixed results,15 partial evidence that class voting is 
higher when there is a clear policy difference between the parties has been found in Britain,16 
Italy17 and in some other Northern European countries.18 
Although these top-down and bottom-up approaches are often considered to be 
competing, this is largely because there has been a considerable amount of controversy over 
whether the impact of social cleavages has in fact declined or not.19 Accordingly, those that 
argue that there has been a gradual long-term decline in class voting tend to emphasize 
sociological explanations of change (which have also been gradual), while those who argue 
that there has been trendless fluctuation tend to emphasize political explanations to do with 
the polarization of the policy space (which also goes up and down). At a theoretical level, 
though, both approaches tap into important aspects of cleavage theory (group identity and 
                                                 
14 Maria Oskarson, ‘Social Structure and Party Choice’, in Jacques Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 84-105.  
15 Paul Nieuwbeerta and Wout Ultee, ‘Class Voting in Western Industrialized Countries, 1945–1990: 
Systematizing and Testing Explanations’, European Journal of Political Research, 35 (1999), 123–60. 
16 Geoffrey Evans, Anthony Heath and Clive Payne, ‘Class: Labour as a Catch-all Party?’ in Geoffrey Evans and 
Pippa Norris, eds, Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective (London: Sage, 
1999), 87-101.  
17 Paolo Bellucci, ‘Un declino precocemente annunciato? Il voto di classe in Italia, 1968–1996’, Polis, 2 (2001), 
203–25; Paolo Bellucci, ‘From Class Voting to Economic Voting. Patterns of Individualization of Electoral 
Behaviour in Italy, 1972–1996’, in Hans Dorussen and Mark Taylor, eds, Economic Voting (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002) 261-283.  
18 Oskarson, ‘Social Structure and Party Choice’. 
19 See Evans, The End of Class Politics? 
 6 
political articulation), and potentially can have independent effects on the strength of 
cleavages in party systems. 
However, a crucial aspect of cleavage theory has hitherto been ignored. By far, and 
surprisingly, the least attention has been devoted to the third element in the notion of a 
cleavage, which focuses on the linkage between parties and organized society, generally 
referred to as ‘segmentation’. The capacity  of parties to penetrate social groups, or to create 
parallel organizations, has been a key factor in reinforcing group identity and interest 
representation, so as to strengthen and perpetuate the cleavage structure.20 According to Stein 
Rokkan, segmentation is the ‘degree of interlocking between cleavage specific organizations 
active in the corporate channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral support’.21 
Building on this notion of segmentation, we argue that it is the structure of this linkage that 
provides the most persuasive account of why the strength of cleavages varies, both over time 
and in relation to each other.22 Parties’ capacity and willingness to recruit politicians   with 
                                                 
20 See Bartolini, The Political Mobilization of the European Left. Indeed, working-class support for the left may 
be regarded as an historical consequence of union penetration in leftist parties, thus creating a link between 
group identity and political support. See, for example, Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and 
Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
21 Stein Rokkan, ‘Towards a Generalized Concept of Verzuiling: A Preliminary Note’, Political Studies, 25 
(1977), 563–70.  
22 Political linkage can be understood in a number of different ways. The seminal contribution on political parties 
and linkage by Lawson distinguishes between (a) participatory linkage, where parties serve as agencies through 
which citizens participate in politics; (b) policy-responsive linkage, which ensure responsiveness by 
governments to people; (c) linkage by reward, as channels for exchange of votes for favours; (d) directive 
linkage, where parties (in non-democratic regimes) are agencies of manipulation and control rather than 
promoting participation. See Kay Lawson, ‘Political Parties and Linkage’, in Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties 
and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 3 – 24. Our 
attention here is on the Rokkanian party–organization linkage, a notion that bridges the first two types discussed 
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ties to different social organizations signals to voters both their commitment towards these 
social interests and reflects also the organizations’ involvement in the electoral process. It 
thus provides a direct channel of representation and incorporation between social groups and 
their political representatives. When this link is strong, voters are clearly able to identify 
which parties stand for their group, and which parties do not, and so vote accordingly. 
This idea of organized parties as vehicles for integrating and incorporating different 
social groups has a long history. Neumann argued that modern democracies could not survive 
unless democratic parties provided the kind of organizational integration offered by their non-
democratic rivals and, in similar vein, Duverger regarded the emergence of mass parties as a 
positive step in democratic evolution, precisely because their locally articulated structures 
ensured a ‘closer and more faithful contact between the mass of the people and their ruling 
elites’.23 These local networks also served to foster political integration and channels of 
mobilization.24 However, since the 1960s the extent to which parties maintain and develop 
these linkages with grass-roots organizations has been questioned. The apparent demise of the 
mass party has been a central feature underpinning the literature on how parties have changed 
                                                                                                                                                        
by Lawson. On how political linkages have changed overtime, see Andrea Rommele, Piero Ignazi and David 
Farrell, eds, Political Parties and Political System: The Concept of Linkage Revisited (Westport: Praeger, 2005). 
Of course, parties are not the only actors which provide linkages between citizens, representative institutions and 
rulers, as the political role of collateral organizations and social movement show. See Thomas Poguntke, 
‘Political Parties and Other Organizations’, in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds, Handbook of Party 
Politics (London: Sage Publications, 2006), pp. 397–405.  
23 Sigmund Neumann, ‘Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties’, in Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern 
Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). Maurice 
Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1964). 
24 Stein Rokkan, ‘Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition, and National Integration’, in Joseph LaPalombara 
and Myron Weiner, eds, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), 241-266 . 
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organizationally, and developed into catch-all parties, rational-efficient parties, electoral-
professional parties, and cartel parties respectively. 25 However, previous empirical research 
has not paid much attention to how these changes at the party organizational level have 
affected patterns of voting behaviour at the individual level. Moreover, due to data 
limitations, the little, but noteworthy, empirical research that has attempted to investigate this 
link has only examined one component of organizational structure, and has focused on the 
organizational density of union or religious associations in society at large, rather than in 
political parties in particular.26 These accounts are, again, more society driven, and are of the 
bottom-up variety, thus failing adequately to address the full concept of segmentation, or 
party–organization linkage. Indeed, as examples from Latin America show, high levels of 
unionization need not necessarily translate in to high levels of class voting.27 What is crucial 
is the penetration of these organizations in political parties rather than just in society. 
In this article we argue that the linkage between parties and social organizations 
constitutes a critical part of the process in translating membership in a social group into 
support for a political party. In particular, drawing on Sniderman and Bullock’s notion of 
                                                 
25 On the catch-all party, see Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in 
LaPalombara and Weiner, eds, Political Parties and Political Development, 177-200. On the rational-efficient 
party, see William Wright, A Comparative Study of Party Organization (Columbus, Oh.: Charles Merrill, 1971). 
On the electoral-professional party, see Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the cartel party, see Richard Katz and Peter Mair, 
‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party 
Politics, 1 (1995), 5–28. On the crisis of the mass party and party failure, see Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, eds, 
When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
26 For example, see Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee, 
‘Class Voting in Western Industrialized Countries’. 
27 Robert Dix, ‘Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, 22 (1989) 23–
37. 
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consistency theory, we would expect cleavage voting to be more likely to occur when the 
social characteristics of the individual voter are consistent with the cleavage-related 
organizational characteristics of the party.28 By contrast, when the social characteristics of the 
voters are not consistent with the characteristics of the parties (that is when voters face cross-
cutting pressures at the organizational level), cleavage voting would be much less likely to 
occur. The Italian dual cleavage system offers a clear opportunity to test these claims, since 
voters are exposed to different party–organizational pressures, and these pressures have 
changed radically and abruptly over time.29 While previous studies have focused mainly on 
voters’ location in the dual Italian cleavage system, assessing the extent to which cleavage 
voting is undercut among voters holding joint class and religion belonging,30 this research, to 
our knowledge, provides the first direct test of the relationship between the structure of party–
organizational linkages and the strength of cleavage voting. In particular, we test the 
following hypotheses. These are: party–organization linkage conditions the underlying 
strength of cleavage voting over time (H1), i.e. linkage is able to explain variation over time 
in the strength of cleavage voting. And party–organization linkage conditions the relative 
                                                 
28 Paul Snidermann and John Bullock, ‘A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Political Choice: The 
Hypothesis of Menu Dependence’, in Willem E. Saris and Paul Snidermann, eds, Studies in Public Opinion: 
Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error and Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 337 
- 375.  
29 On the development of the religious and class cleavages in Italy and on their impact on voting up to the 1960s, 
see Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
30 The lower level of class voting in Italy compared to other European democracies has traditionally been 
explained by the pervasiveness of religion belonging, which produces cross-pressures on voters with both 
religion and class belonging. See, Tom Mackie, Renato Mannheimer and Giacomo Sani, ‘Italy’, in Mark N. 
Franklin, Tom Mackie and Henry Valen, eds, Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal 
Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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strength of cleavage voting between social groups (H2). The corollary of these hypotheses is 
that policy polarization is unable to account for the underlying strength of cleavage voting 
over time, though it may influence short-term variation (H3). 
 
RESEARCH STRATEGY  
With the transition from what has been termed the First to the Second Republic,31 the Italian 
case provides a particularly instructive natural experiment to test these claims. This is so 
because the dramatic change in the party system in the early 1990s, the demise of the ruling 
Christian Democratic and Socialist parties, the rise of new parties such as Forza Italia and the 
transformation of the former Communists into Democratici di Sinistra have allowed us to 
model the impact of changing structural alternatives at the party–organizational level, holding 
the social characteristics of the electorate relatively constant.32 ().  
To test the impact of these changes on the level of cleavage voting over time in Italy 
we have analysed a merged dataset, which combines information on voters, policy 
polarization and party-organization linkages. First, to examine the social characteristics and 
voting behaviour of individuals over time, we use pooled cross-sectional data from national 
population surveys of the Italian electorate from 1963 to 2008.33 This is the longest time- 
series data on political behaviour available in Italy covering thirteen elections and consisting 
                                                 
31 Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli, Political Institutions in Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
32 Most studies over time have held constant the political factors, since party system change of this type is 
relatively rare in mature democracies, and examined change in society.  
33 The surveys used are Istituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica – Doxa, 1963 
survey  ; Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008. For 
each survey N varies between a low of 705 (in 1992) and a high of 2,400 (in 1968). Average sample size per 
survey is 2,300.  
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of 30,009 interviews. Secondly, to examine the policy platforms of the political parties over 
time, we use Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group,34 supplemented by 
2006 and 2008 data, which was provided by CIRCaP-Università di Siena.35 Thirdly, to 
examine the links between representatives and organizations affiliated to the major social 
cleavages over time, we use what we believe to be a unique dataset on the associational 
memberships of MPs (using data from the CIRCaP Italian Political Elite Study from 1963 to 
2008).36 
 
Measurement  
The structure of political competition in Italy has undergone a number of changes over the 
last fifty years, and some simplifying assumptions are obviously necessary in order to carry 
out comparative research over time. To this end, we focus on competition between party 
blocs.37 From 1968 to 1992, the principal political conflict was between the leftist PCI bloc 
(in which we include PCI, PSI and the other minor left lists) and the centrist DC bloc (in 
which we include DC, PSDI and PRI). Following the corruption scandals of the early 1990s 
many of these parties disappeared and new parties entered the political stage. From 1994 
                                                 
34 Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum,  Mapping Political 
Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
35 We wish to thank Nicolò Conti (CIRCaP-Università di Siena), the author of the content analysis of the 2006 
and 2008 coalitions’ manifestos, who generously shared with us his own research. 
36 This study was originally directed by Giovanni Sartori, and later by Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli at 
CIRCaP-Università di Siena. Samples of representatives from each legislature have been surveyed to collect data 
on the political careers and political attitudes of MPs over time. We thank CIRCaP for making available this 
unique data source. The usual disclaimer for responsibility of analysis and interpretation applies. 
37 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. See Note to Appendix Table A for 
explanation of abbreviations of party names. 
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onwards, the structure of electoral competition was somewhat different, and the principal 
opposition has been between the centre-left PDS bloc (Margherita, Verdi, etc.) and the centre-
right Forza Italia/PDL bloc (AN, Lega). The implosion of the Christian Democrats led to the 
emergence of several DC splinter groups, which eventually aligned either on the left camp 
(Margherita) or on the right camp (CCD/UDC), contributing to the bipolar structure of 
competition which has characterized Italy’s recent elections (see Appendix Table A for details 
of exact coding). This change in the party system allows us to examine the impact of 
changing political alternatives, holding social change more or less constant. The main 
dependent variable that we use is whether respondents voted for the (centre) left PCI-PDS 
bloc or the (centre) right DC-FI-PDL bloc.38 The main independent variables that we consider 
at the individual level are class and religion. To measure class, we adopt a simple 
manual/non-manual dichotomy, while to measure religion we employ a binary measure of 
church attendance: whether respondents attend church every week, or rarely/never.39 We also 
construct a four-fold variable which combines these two measures to take into account voters’ 
overlapping class and religious characteristics. 
 
Policy Space  
To measure the polarization of the policy space we follow previous research by drawing on 
party manifesto data. These data provide a useful indication of party positions since they 
                                                 
38 The exact question wordings for the vote have changed somewhat over time. When a vote question was not 
available (1963, 1975), we relied on party closeness. Although the marginal distribution of these variables is 
somewhat different, the association between class and religion is not. 
39 There are a number of ways in which class can be measured; see Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe, The 
Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). However, 
earlier research suggests that in Italy the most salient distinction is between manual and non-manual occupations. 
See Bellucci, ‘Un declino precocemente annunciato?’ 
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represent the choices that the electorate faces before each election. We employ a slightly 
modified version of the traditional Laver and Budge methodology,40 and compute the left–
right scores of the various parties on explicit economic issues by summing up the percentages 
of all the sentences in the left category, and subtracting their total from the sum of the 
percentages of the sentences in the right category.41 Following Bartolini and Mair,42 we focus 
purely on economic policy sentences in the parties’ manifestos which are directly related to 
the class cleavage – that is individuals’ social position in the market – leaving aside other 
realms (i.e., military, freedom, human rights, peace, etc.) which, although relevant to the 
overall left–right divide, have a less distinctive cleavage content. Furthermore, it is parties’ 
economic policies that are generally thought to have greatest impact on class voting.43 There 
are a number of ways in which these party positions can be summarized, and following 
previous research we employ a simple measure of policy difference between the two main 
political groups, where the policy position of each bloc is calculated as the mean policy 
position of each of its constituent parties.44 A similar approach is used to describe the 
                                                 
40 Michael Laver and Ian Budge, eds, Party Policy and Government Coalitions (London: Macmillan, 1992). 
41 Right Emphasis: Sum of sentences belonging to the following categories: 401 Free Enterprise; 402 Incentives; 
407 Protectionsim; 414 Economic orthodoxy. Left Emphasis: Sum of sentences belonging to the following 
categories: 403 Market Regulation; 404 Economic Planning; 406 Protectionsim; 412 Controlled Economy; 
413 Nationalization.  
42 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. 
43 See, for example, Lipset et al., ‘The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behaviour’; Douglas A. 
Hibbs Jr, The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987); Oskarson, ‘Social Structure and Party Choice’. For a full description of the variables used in the analysis 
see Budge et al., Mapping Political Preferences. 
44 See Evans et al., ‘Class: Labour as a Catch-all Party?’ We also computed bloc position by applying a fixed 
weight based on parties average vote share across each republic. The two measures correlate highly (Pearson R =  
0.92).  
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emphasis of religious issues, based on the two available items from the party manifesto data. 
The first refers to positive mentions of traditional morality (Item 603) and the second refers to 
negative mentions (Item 604).45 The measures are computed in the same way as above. 
 
Party–Organization Linkage 
To measure the linkage between social cleavage group organizations and political parties we 
use the MP study to examine the associational affiliations of the MPs in each party bloc. We 
focus on two variables: whether MPs have held an official position in trade unions, and 
whether they have held an official position in organizations affiliated to the Catholic Church , 
such as parish councils or church-sponsored cultural or leisure organizations. Since Italy has 
historically exhibited a dual cleavage system based on both religion and class, we also take 
into account how these organizational affiliations overlap, that is whether MPs belong to both 
church and union organizations (or neither). In this way, it is possible to relate the structure of 
the party–organizational links to the social characteristics of the voter at the individual level, 
and to measure the degree of congruence between the two. This allows us to move beyond 
macro and micro level approaches to voting behaviour to take into account the meso level, 
which provides the link between the two. The stronger the consistency between the 
organizational characteristics of the party and the social characteristics of the voter, the closer 
the links between voter and party and the more likely we would expect cleavage voting to 
occur. 
There are a number of ways in which the structure of party–organization linkages can 
be summarized, and we have inspected various indices of difference, or dissimilarity. 
                                                 
45 Since there are only two indicators available to measure religious–secular issues we must treat the results with 
a certain degree of caution since it is possible that we have not been able to measure the full range of the 
concept.  
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However, the problems with such indices is that they only provide an overall measure of 
difference (or similarity) between party organization characteristics and voters’ social 
characteristics and are not able to take into account the direction of this difference (for 
example, whether the voter is more similar to the left or the right). To summarize the 
consistency between party and voter, therefore, we have followed Lieberson and employed an 
Index of Net Difference (IND).46 IND is a particularly appropriate measure of difference, 
since it can be applied to comparisons where an ordered distribution varies across groups, and 
in addition, unlike the index of dissimilarity, it summarizes both difference and direction 
(either positive or negative), indicating to which party the voter is closest. The index of net 
difference is based on rank-sum comparisons between groups, in which populations X and Y 
are compared with characteristic, I, where X refers to MPs from the leftist bloc, Y refers to 
MPs from the centrist DC-FI-PDL bloc, and I is the voters’ social characteristics. The Index 
of Net Difference provides a summary measure of the probability that the social 
characteristics of voter i are consistent with one party rather than another. The computational 
procedure is shown below. The order of the subscripts indicates the direction of the 
probability difference. Thus INDxy means that pr (Y > X) has been subtracted from pr (X > Y). 
Hence a positive value indicates that the latter probability is higher, and a negative value 
indicates the opposite.  
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46 See Stanley Lieberson, ‘Rank-sum Comparisons between Groups’, Sociological Methodology, 7 (1976), 276–
91. 
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Since the structure of party–organization linkages creates different pressures on different sets 
of voters, according to the nature of the voters’ social characteristics, the rank-order of MPs’ 
associational linkages will vary from group to group. For example, secular working-class 
voters face reinforcing positive pressures from (a) MPs with union associational involvement 
(since this appeals on both a class and a secular basis) and negative pressures from those with 
(b) church involvement (for opposite reasons). However, the same voters face cross-cutting 
pressures from (c) MPs with church–union involvement (which appeals on class lines but not 
religious lines) and (d) no-association involvement (which is nominally secular, but not 
working-class either). Treating religion as the dominant cleavage in the dual cleavage system, 
the consistency between party characteristics and voter characteristics can be rank-ordered a, 
d, c, b (although alternative rank-orderings which do not differentiate between d and c 
produce almost identical results). In this way the structure of party–organization linkages can 
be rank-ordered for each group of voters in terms of the degree of congruence between party 
identity and voter identity. Table 1 summarizes the rank-order for each of the different social 
groups. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
The index is calculated with respect to each social group by year. An IND of 0.61 indicates 
that, for example, for the secular working class in 1968, the organizational links of an MP 
from the leftist bloc are more consistent with the voters’ social characteristics 61 per cent 
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more often than an MP from the centrist bloc. By contrast, a negative value indicates that the 
social characteristics of the voter in question are better represented by the associational 
linkages on the centre-right. For example, an IND of –0.55 indicates that for the Catholic 
working class in 1968, the organizational links of an MP from the centre-right bloc are more 
consistent with the voters’ social characteristics 55 per cent more often than an MP from the 
left bloc. Finally, we compute the difference between the IND for each social group and the 
IND for the secular working class, as our reference category. Thus, from the above example, 
the IND for secular working class (0.61) minus the IND for Catholic working class (-0.55) = 
1.15.  Positive values, then, indicate that the group in question (in this case the Catholic 
working class) faces stronger organizational linkages with the centre than the secular working 
class, and negative values indicate that they face weaker linkages. This then provides a 
summary measure of the incentives for each group of voters in relation to the secular working 
class to vote for the left bloc or the centre bloc. 
 
CHANGES OVER TIME  
We begin, in Figure 1, by reporting the log odds of religious voting and class voting since the 
1960s. In each election we use logistic regression with a binary-dependent variable 
contrasting vote for the centre-right DC-FI bloc (coded 1) and the centre-left PCI-DS bloc 
(coded 0). The independent variables are class (coded 1 for middle-class; 0 for working-class) 
and religion (coded 1 for regular church-goer; 0 for irregular/never).47 A clear pattern is 
immediately evident. First, there is a sudden rupture in the relationship between both religion 
and vote and class and vote in 1994, with the transition to the Second Republic; the level of 
religious voting in 1994 was very much lower than previously, and the level of class voting 
                                                 
47 In 1979 we lack data on church attendance, and so impute the missing data from an item on the importance of 
religion. However, the results from this are not substantially different to what they would have been if we had 
used data on church attendance from earlier (1978) or later (1980) years. 
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was somewhat lower than previously. Secondly, since 1994 the level of class voting has 
fluctuated up and down, and in 2006 was only a little lower than levels observed in the First 
Republic, only to drop down again in the last election in 2008. However, the religious 
cleavage has remained at historically very low levels.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE PLEASE] 
 
The sudden nature of this rupture makes us sceptical about the claims of the modernization 
thesis, since changes in the social characteristics of the electorate cannot explain the sudden 
change in the determinants of electoral choice that we observe. This suggests that the 
structure of the political alternatives is the driving force behind the observed pattern, and for 
this reason it is on these political explanations that we now focus.  
 
Policy Differences  
Figures 2 and 3 plot the policy positions of the centre-left bloc and centre-right bloc over time 
on each of the policy dimensions. Three noteworthy trends appear: first, left–right issues are 
consistently much more salient than religious–secular issues, as can be seen from the 
difference between the relative number of mentions that each of these issues receives.48 
Secondly, policy distance between the blocs on economic issues was small during the First 
Republic (particularly from 1976 to 1979 during the period of the historic compromise), 
mainly due to the fact that most of the ideologically polarized nature of Italian party politics 
                                                 
48 The party bloc positions on the Secular–Religious Index range between +/- 4 mentions, while those on the 
Left–Right Index range between -10/+20 mentions.  
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was based on the West–East international divide.49 In the Second Republic we observe 
increased policy difference on left–right issues. However, following the highly polarized 
elections of 2006 both party blocs have converged on the centre. Thirdly, there is not much 
variation over time in the emphasis of religious–secular issues during the First Republic (with 
some convergence during the period of controversial legislation on abortion and divorce in 
the 1970s), while variation has grown in the last three elections. Overall, there has been 
considerably more variation in the emphasis of economic left–right issues than of religious 
ones.50 
 
[FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
CLASS VOTING AND LEFT–RIGHT POLICY DIFFERENCE  
Next we turn to examine the impact of these policy positions on the politicization of social 
cleavages. The first hypothesis we test is that policy polarization does not explain per se the 
long-term trend of cleavage voting. Figure 4 depicts the trends over time for the association 
between class and vote (log odds) compared to the policy difference between the two main 
blocs on economic left–right issues. On first inspection, there appears to be a relatively close 
                                                 
49 For the political salience of this divide, see Pierangelo Isernia, ‘Bandiera e risorse. La  politica estera negli 
anni ottanta’, in Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia, eds, Il gigante dai piedi d’argilla (Bologna: il Mulino, 
1996), 139 – 188..  
50 Pelizzo raises doubts about Party Manifesto Data’s ability to correctly identify parties’ positions in the 
political space, particularly in the Italian case. See Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Party Position or Party Direction? An 
Analysis of Party Manifesto Data’, Western European Politics, 2 (2003) 67–89; and Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Party 
Direction: The Italian Case in Comparative Perspective’, Party Politics, 1 (2010), 51–67. Pelizzo argues that 
rather than indicating position, manifestos indicate movement, and that parties use manifestos to adjust their 
policy position in order to attract voters. We agree with this interpretation, and are thus more interested in 
whether the party blocs move towards each other or away from each other, rather than where they stand per se. 
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fit between the two time trends, particularly within each republic. When the policy difference 
decreases the level of class voting also tends to decrease, and similarly when the policy 
difference increases the level of class voting also tends to increase. However, there is one 
important exception to this trend. The polarization of the policy space is unable to account for 
the sharp decline in class voting in 1994, nor its historically low level thereafter. Over the 
entire period the correlation between policy difference and the strength of class voting is, 
therefore, not significant (R = -0.08).  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
Table 2 formally tests this association by regressing at the aggregate level the strength of the 
class coefficients on policy difference over the 1963–2008 period. From Model 1 we can see 
that policy difference is not significant (b = 0.003) for the entire time period (and it is not 
significant when we include a lagged dependent variable either). There is thus little evidence 
that parties’ changing emphases of left–right issues explain the long-term trend of class 
voting. However, when we include a dummy for the transition to the Second Republic we can 
see (in Model 2) that policy difference does explain some of the variation within each 
republic (b = 0.012) and is significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that policy difference 
has little impact on the underlying long-term level of class voting that we observe, although it 
may have some impact on the short-term residual variation. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.] 
  
RELIGIOUS VOTING AND RELIGIOUS–SECULAR POLICY DIFFERENCE  
Next we turn to inspect the relationship over time between religion (church attendance) and 
vote compared to the level of religious–secular policy difference. Figure 5 depicts the trends 
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over time in the log odds for the association between religiosity and vote, compared to the 
policy difference between the two main blocs on religious–secular issues. There is very little 
sign of any correlation. But we must recall that, as we have already observed, the salience of 
religious issues in the party manifestos has tended to be very weak. It is, therefore, perhaps 
not surprising that voters do not respond to movement in what are basically relatively weak 
signals. However, our expectation that the centre bloc’s move towards secularism during the 
late 1970s may have weakened religious voting is clearly not fulfilled, and despite this change 
of emphasis the religious cleavage was in fact if anything slightly stronger during this period. 
Similarly, even though the policy difference on religious–secular issues was much the same in 
1994 as it was in 1992 (even a little higher), there was a pronounced drop in the log odds of 
religious voting. The findings are supported by the lack of statistical significance for the 
overall association between religious voting and religious policy difference (b = -0.146). And 
this holds also in the First Republic and the Second Republic (see Table 2). The religious 
cleavage does not, therefore, appear to respond to political polarization. It is able to explain 
neither residual variation nor the underlying level. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
So, although we find partial evidence that policy difference influences the level of cleavage 
voting, there remains a number of important questions that previous approaches have been 
unable to answer. The dramatic decline in class and religious voting in 1994 cannot be 
attributed to changes in the policy difference between the parties – both class and religious 
issues were expressed in the electoral arena to more or less the same level as previously, but 
none the less the level of cleavage voting sharply declined. Neither can this sudden decline be 
attributed to social change, since between 1992 and 1994 the social characteristics of the 
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electorate were held more or less constant. Moreover, policy difference cannot explain why 
levels of religious voting have historically been much higher than class voting and, indeed, 
given the greater salience of left–right issues, would indicate that it should be the opposite 
way round. This suggests that the variables that we have so far considered neglect a crucial 
part of the story. 
 
PARTY–ORGANIZATION LINKAGES  
To shed light on this process we consider the organizational links between the political parties 
and their social constituents. This can be thought of as describing the ‘closure’ of the 
cleavage, and the level of party–organization mobilization. According to our first hypothesis, 
the stronger the involvement of organized groups in the parties, the more strongly voters 
perceive parties as committed to the representation of their social interests and the higher we 
would expect the level of cleavage voting to be. The MP data provide a unique way of 
examining how these linkages have changed over time, and whether these correlate with the 
strength of cleavage voting.  
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
Figure 6 plots the difference in levels of organizational linkage between the left bloc and the 
centre according to the different types of cleavage associations that their MPs belong to (e.g. 
church only, church and union, union only).51 The trend over time reveals a dramatic change 
in the structure of parties’ associational involvement. The early period is marked by high 
levels of church and church–union involvement in the centre bloc, and high union 
                                                 
51 Positive values indicate that there are higher levels of organizational mobilization in the centre, negative 
values indicate higher levels of mobilization on the left. 
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involvement in the left bloc. There are thus clear differences between the political alternatives 
and voters were then exposed to clear signs about each party’s commitment to specific social 
interests. In the latter period these differences are much more blurred and, with the transition 
to the Second Republic, there is a sharp decline in the level of church and church–union 
involvement in the centre-right, and also a decline in the level of union penetration in the 
centre-left. Whereas the old DC bloc was characterized by close ties with the church, and to a 
lesser extent the unions, the Forza Italia-PDL bloc that emerged in its wake does not have this 
organizational base. It is made up largely of businessmen and professionals with little or no 
previous political experience, who lack established links with organized society.52 After 1994 
we see an increase in the level of union involvement in the left, but it is still at somewhat 
lower levels than the historical average from the First Republic. However, church and 
church–union mobilization remain very low, and have in fact crossed over so they are now 
somewhat higher in the left than in the centre.   
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.]  
 
To summarize how these changes have altered the incentive structure for different groups of 
voters we need to take into account how the different social dimensions of party involvement 
combine to reinforce or cut across voters’ social identities. To this end we consider the 
Lieberson Index of Net Difference (IND) that we discussed in the measurement section, 
which provides a summary measure of the extent to which the organizational characteristics 
of parties reflect the social characteristics of voters. From Figure 7, according to the IND, we 
                                                 
52 See Luca Verzichelli , ‘Da un ceto parlamentare all’altro. Il mutamento del personale legislativo italiano’, in 
Roberto D’Alimonte and Stefani Bartolini, eds, Maggioritario finalmente? La transizione elettorale 1994–2001 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 319 - 361. 
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can see that during the First Republic the social characteristics of the Catholic working class 
and Catholic middle class were much more consistent with the organizational linkages of the 
MPs from the centre than they were with those from the left (shown by values of IND well 
below zero), whereas the social characteristics of the secular working class and the secular 
middle class were much more consistent with the structure of organizational affiliations of the 
MPs from the left (shown by values of IND well above zero). There were thus strong 
incentives for each of the social groups to favour one party over the other. However, the 
clarity of this choice breaks down in 1994, when these representational linkages were severely 
disrupted. The Catholic middle class and the secular working class after that date no longer 
had any clear organizational incentive to favour one party bloc over the other (as shown by an 
IND of close to zero), and the Catholic working class and the secular middle class then faced 
organizational incentives to support the bloc that historically they had been opposed to.   
 Given these changes in the structure of party organization linkages, we would expect 
the pattern of cleavage voting to be severely disrupted. To examine the impact that these 
changes in the structure of parties’ organization linkages have had on the level of cleavage 
voting over time, we need to consider the overlap between the class and religious identities 
that voters hold (such as whether they are Catholic and working-class, or secular and 
working-class etc.) and relate the structure of the choice to the characteristics of the chooser. 
Therefore, we rely on the four-fold variable which combines information on the class and 
religious characteristics of the voters, distinguishing between: (1) secular working class, (2) 
secular middle class, (3) Catholic working class, and (4) Catholic middle class. Using binary 
logistic regression we can estimate the likelihood of voting centre-right rather than centre-left 
in each election for each group in relation to the secular working class, which is our reference 
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category. Similarly, in order to construct an equivalent comparison, we compare the IND for 
each group in question to the IND for the secular working class.53 
 
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.] 
 
Figure 8 depicts the trends over time for the log odds of the secular middle class voting centre 
rather than left compared to the secular working class (reference category), and the 
corresponding Index of Net Difference, relative to the secular working class. At first glance 
there does not appear to be any correlation between the two time trends, although this should 
not come as too much of a surprise. Neither of the terms is particularly strong – the IND sends 
only a weak signal, and the log odds ratios register only a weak effect. Under these 
circumstances there is likely to be plenty of noise.  
 
[FIGURES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.] 
 
Figures 9 and 10 plot the trends over time for organizational mobilization and level of 
cleavage voting for the Catholic working class and Catholic middle class, respectively. In 
both cases a much clearer picture emerges and there appears to be a very strong correlation. 
The level of cleavage voting is very much higher when the Index of Net Difference relative to 
the secular working class is high during the First Republic, and very much lower when the 
IND is low during the Second Republic. The structure of the organizational linkages between 
                                                 
53 The logits which are presented in Figs. 8–10 are, for each election, the log odds of voting centre-right (rather 
than centre-left) for, respectively, the Secular Middle Class, Catholic Working Class and Catholic Middle Class 
in relation to the Secular Working Class (reference category). 
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the two blocs would, therefore, appear to be able to account for a great deal of the variation 
over time in the level of cleavage voting. 
We can test the relationship between the Index of Net Difference for the structure of 
party– organizational linkages and cleavage voting more formally by use of linear regression. 
We specify the following autoregressive model, with a lagged dependent variable:  
tttt eXYY   2110  , 
where Yt is the strength of cleavage voting (measured as the log odds of groupi voting centre 
rather than left compared to the secular working class) at time t; 0 is the constant;, 1 is the 
lagged dependent variable; 2  is the Index of Net Difference (for groupi in relation to secular 
working class) at time t, et is a random error term and the total number of observations in the 
dataset is 12. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.] 
Table 3 presents the results for each social group. As suspected, there is little evidence of any 
association between the log odds of cleavage voting and the IND of party–organization 
linkage over time for the secular middle class (Model 1), but there is a highly significant 
association between the two measures for both the Catholic working class (Model 2) and the 
Catholic middle class (Model 3), where the signal coming from the structure of party–
organization linkages is much more pronounced and clearly differentiated. These results are 
robust and the main effects of the structure of organization linkages still hold when we re-run 
the models with a lagged dependent variable (Models 4, 5 and 6). Overall then, the models 
provide a very good fit to the data, and provide a strong account of changes over time in the 
strength of cleavages. This finding clearly supports our main hypothesis that the structure of 
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organizational linkages between cleavage specific groups and political parties conditions the 
underlying strength of social cleavages in the electoral arena. Whereas accounts of social 
change and policy mobilization are both unable to explain the long-term trends in cleavage 
voting observed in Italy, accounts which emphasize the organizational characteristics of the 
parties are much more able to do so. 
These results indicate that there is a strong correlation between party–organizational 
linkage and cleavage voting over time. Our hypothesis is that this is a causal relationship, and 
that linkage influences the level of cleavage voting. However, it is also possible that the 
causal arrow could flow in the opposite direction, and that the level of cleavage voting may 
influence linkage. From this perspective as (or if) cleavage voting declines, parties will 
become less willing to recruit politicians with organizational ties, since this mobilization 
strategy becomes less electorally attractive. To examine this possibility we use lag variables 
to specify the relationship in the opposite direction, and model the impact of cleavage voting 
on party–organization linkage. Moreover, we also control for the size of the core (religious) 
electorate, by including the percentage of respondents who regularly attend church. 
 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.) 
 
In order to do this we stack the dataset and treat the log odds of each social group voting 
centre/left in each election year as a separate case.54  Since the observations for each year are 
not formally independent of each other, we focus on the strength and pattern of association 
rather than on levels of significance. This gives us thirty-three observations on cleavage 
                                                 
54 This is in essence a variant of the two-step hierarchical regression approach proposed by Achen; see 
Christopher Achen, ‘Two-step Hierarchical Estimation: Beyond Regression Analysis’, Political Analysis, 13 
(2005), 447–56. 
 28 
voting. We test six models (Table 4). First, Model 1 regresses the strength of cleavage voting 
on the IND and the lagged dependent variable. Both terms are substantively large and in the 
predicted direction. This is consistent with the findings from above when applied to the entire 
dataset. Secondly, we specify alternative forms of this relationship. Model 2 uses only lagged 
variables at t - 1 to predict the strength of cleavage voting at time t. The pattern is similar to 
that of Model 1 and  provides further support for our central hypothesis since it suggests the 
correct temporal ordering. Model 3 specifies the relationship in the opposite direction, that is 
it reverses the direction of the causal arrow. We use lagged terms to predict the IND at time t. 
The lag of IND at t - 1 is substantively large, as we would expect, but the lag of cleavage 
voting at t - 1 is effectively zero. This suggests that the relationship does not go in the 
opposite direction, and the decline of linkage in Italy is not being driven by a political 
response to the decline of cleavage voting.  
Finally, Models 4 to 6 also include  the percentage of the population who regularly 
attend church since it could be argued that either linkage and/or cleavage voting are simply 
responding to shrinkage of the core religious electorate. We can see that, while the effect of 
church attendance is in the predicted direction, its inclusion does not materially alter the 
estimated effects of either the lagged IND or cleavage voting. 
So far we have only considered the dynamics of cleavage voting over time for each of 
the different social groups, but the structure of organizational linkages also sheds light on the 
relative strength of these cleavages in relation to each other, such as why the log odds of the 
Catholic middle class voting centre were so much higher than the log odds of the secular 
middle class doing so (Hypothesis 2). To test this claim, we next turn our attention to see 
whether organizational linkages can also explain the relative salience of cleavages between 
groups, and in doing so provide a robust test for the impact that it has on voting behaviour. In 
order to do this, we merge the IND data on organizational linkages to our pooled cross-
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sectional survey data, creating a hierarchical multilevel model in which individuals are the 
level 1 unit, and party–organization linkages are the level 2 unit. Our expectation is that the 
magnitude of the coefficients for the impact of individual-level social characteristics on vote 
choice will increase when the IND of associational linkages also increases. That is, that the 
interaction term between IND and social characteristics will be significant and positive. 
Moreover, our second expectation is that this simple and parsimonious model will provide an 
accurate prediction of the actual variations that we observe in the level of cleavage voting, not 
only over time but also between groups: that the majority of the variation, both between 
groups and over time can be explained with reference to the structure of organizational 
linkages, and any impact of other factors is hence marginal. 
 
The general model we test is the following:  
)21( 32110 tttt eXXYfVOTE    , 
where VOTE is party support (1 = centre-right; 0 = centre-left) at election t, 0 is the constant, 
1  the social characteristics of the voter (where secular working class is the reference 
category and; 1 = secular middle class; 2 = Catholic working class; 3 = Catholic middle 
class), 2 is an interaction term between the IND of associational linkages and social 
characteristics of the voter, 3 is an interaction term between policy difference on economic 
issues and social characteristics of the voter.55 Since the dependent variable is a dichotomy, 
we use binomial logit analysis to estimate the parameter estimates. The model provides a 
strict test of our hypothesis since it assumes that the strength of cleavage voting has remained 
                                                 
55 We do not include the parent term for the IND since we have no theoretical expectation about the effect of 
organizational linkages on party vote share, only about the effect on cleavage voting. 
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constant over time, with the only variation due to changes in the party structure of 
associational linkages. 
 
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.) 
 
Table 5 reports the parameter estimates from the model. First, Model 1 includes class and 
religion at the individual level and the cross-level interaction between class and religion and 
the IND for party–organization linkages at the contextual level. We can see that the 
interaction term is highly significant and positive, indicating that the strength of cleavage 
voting does respond to the structure of organizational linkages. Since our intention is not to 
try and explain vote choice, but rather to explain differences in the observed levels of 
cleavage voting, we are not particularly interested in the model fit statistics. Instead, in order 
to assess how successfully we have managed to explain differences in cleavage voting we 
compare the predicted effect of class and religion on vote choice from Model 1 (imputing the 
observed value of IND for each year) against the observed effect of class and religion on vote 
choice over time. The correlation between our predicted estimates and our observed estimates 
is a highly significant 0.92. The R2 is 0.84, indicating that our model manages to explain 84 
per cent of the variation in the strength of cleavage voting between 1968 and 2008. Moreover, 
if we compare the kappa index of observed cleavage voting, with the kappa index of the 
predicted cleavage voting, using just the interaction between IND and social characteristics, 
we get R2 = 0.83 with b 1.54, which is a very strong and positive correlation.56 From this we 
                                                 
56 The Kappa index is a summary measure of the variation in cleavage voting between groups. It is based on the 
standard deviation of the log odds. See Michael Hout, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, ‘The Democratic Class 
Struggle in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1948–1992’, American Sociological Review, 60 (1995), 805–28. To save 
space we do not report the findings in a table, but calculations are available upon request from the authors. 
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can infer that variation in voting behaviour between social groups is strongly related to the 
variation in the Index of Net Difference of party–association linkages. This elegant and 
parsimonious model is, therefore, able to account for a considerable amount of the variation in 
cleavage voting, both in terms of why some cleavages are stronger than others (Hypothesis 2), 
and why the strength of these cleavages vary over time (Hypothesis 1). 
In Model 2 we see whether policy difference between the parties in terms of their 
manifestos has any impact on the strength of cleavage voting. The cross-level interaction 
between policy difference and voter characteristics does not have much impact on the strength 
of cleavage voting. It has no significant impact on the magnitude of the coefficient for 
Catholic middle class, and although it does have a significant impact on secular middle class 
and Catholic working class, it is only in the expected direction for the latter. These results 
thus confirm previous research which has found only a patchy impact of policy difference on 
cleavage voting. Although we did see some variation in the level of policy difference on class 
voting at the bivariate level (see Table 2), these results are not robust and do not hold when 
we introduce controls. This emphasizes the caution that must be exercised about inferring 
individual-level patterns from aggregate patterns. Indeed, this null finding should come as no 
surprise. The principle of cleavages rests much more on ideas about social representation than 
it does on simple policy representation. If cleavage voting were based solely – or even mainly 
– on the latter, then the phenomenon would be more accurately described as issue voting 
rather than cleavage voting. 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE PLEASE.] 
 
The final test that we run is to introduce more rigorous controls, to examine whether the 
impact of organizational linkages on cleavage voting still holds up when we control for a 
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variety of other social and political factors. Since relevant controls are not available for all the 
surveys in our dataset we drop the studies for 1963, 1976 and 1979.  Additional controls are 
specified for age, sex, education and region. We also control for political subculture, which 
refers to the socio-political identities that have long been found to have an important impact 
on voting behaviour in Italy.57 Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regression. 
Controlling for socio-demographics alone (Model 1) or socio-demographics and political 
subculture (Model 2), we can see that the interaction term between IND and class-religion is 
highly significant and in the expected direction, confirming our earlier hypotheses. We can, 
therefore, have a high degree of confidence that these results are robust, and hold up even 
when we control for other factors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Previous research on the decline of cleavages has tended to emphasize two main factors – 
social change within the electorate, and political change in terms of the mobilizing strategies 
of parties to alter the salience of cleavage-related issues, as measured by what they say they 
will do in their manifestos. We have argued that neither of these factors is able to explain the 
dynamics of cleavage voting in Italy (and we would argue elsewhere as well) adequately, 
without taking into account a third factor: the linkage between parties and societal 
organizations, a factor capable of reinforcing group identity and interest representation and a 
key element in the notion of cleavage. 
Our research shows that the dynamics of cleavage voting in Italy cannot be attributed 
to social change or to direct changes in party policy. As to the first, the sharp drop in the early 
                                                 
57 See Arturo Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘Relazioni  partiti-elettori a tipi di voto’, in Arturo Parisi and 
Gianfranco Pasquino, eds, Continuità e mutamento elettorale in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977), 215–49;  
Renato Mannheimer and Giacomo Sani , Il mercato elettorale. Identikit dell’elettore italiano (Bologna, il 
Mulino,1987).] 
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1990s in class and religious voting happened during too short a period for any social change 
to have taken place. As to the second, while there is partial evidence that the class cleavage 
responds to policy, evidence of this is lacking in the case of the religious cleavage, and in 
either case it cannot explain the long-term trend and is not robust to the inclusion of additional 
variables. By introducing parties’ associational linkage – the interlocking of parties and 
cleavage-specific social organizations – as an explanatory variable we can account for these 
long-term trends in the level of cleavage voting, and also the relative strength of different 
social cleavages within the electorate.  
We would finally argue that in Italy, and elsewhere in Europe, the erosion of 
traditional cleavages (both class and religious) is neither a forced scenario (driven by social 
change and modernization) nor a process immune to changes in the role parties play in the 
political and social arena. In this contribution we have sought to provide an explanation of the 
causal mechanisms underpinning and conditioning the decline of cleavage voting, but this is 
an open process with potentially different outcomes. This leads us to conclude that politics 
remains the key variable in explaining changes in the determinants of voting, and that the 
nature of parties plays a central role in the relationship between societal social changes and 
political dynamics. To the extent that parties – as the literature on the cartel party in Europe 
assumes – become an institutional articulation of the state and lose systematic links with 
organized society, we can expect a further decline of cleavage voting. By contrast, the Italian 
case together with some recent comparative research on organizations’ political 
intermediation, suggests the changing nature of the relationship between parties and organized 
society need not assume a definitive separation between the two.58  The structures of political 
                                                 
58 See Paolo Bellucci, Marco Maraffi and Paolo Segatti, ‘Intermediation through Secondary Associations: The 
Organizational Context of Electoral Behaviour’, in Richard Gunther, José Montero and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds, 
Democracy, Intermediation and Voting on Four Continents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135 - 182. 
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linkage may change but, though at a lower level than it was in the heyday of cleavage politics 
and mass parties, the relationship between social identities and organized interests are likely 
to continue to constrain an extreme individualization of voting choices.   
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TABLE 1 Rank Ordered Similarity between Party-Organization Affiliations and Voter 
Characteristics  
  
Voters’ social 
characteristics 
Rank order 
1 2 3 4 
     
Secular working-
class 
Union only 
affiliation 
No affiliation Church–union 
affiliation 
Church affiliation 
     
Secular middle-
class 
No affiliation Union affiliation Church affiliation Church–union 
affiliation 
     
Catholic 
working-class 
Church–union 
affiliation 
Church affiliation Union affiliation No affiliation 
     
Catholic middle-
class 
Church affiliation Church–union 
affiliation 
No affiliation Union affiliation 
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Fig. 1. The strength of religious and class cleavages, 1963–2008 (log odds of voting centre 
compared to left) 
 
Sources: Istituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica – Doxa, 1963 survey, Mass 
Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four Nation 
Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008. 
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Fig. 2. Party bloc positions on left–right economic issues, 1963–2008 
 
Sources: Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Ian Budge, Hans-
Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum,  Mapping Political Preferences: 
Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)); 
and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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Fig. 3. Party bloc positions on secular–religious issues, 1968–2008 
 
Sources: Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., 
Mapping Political Preferences); and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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Fig. 4. Class voting (log odds) and polarization of left–right issues, 1963–2008 
 
Sources: Istituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica – Doxa, 1963 survey, Mass 
Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975, Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four Nation 
Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; Party 
Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., Mapping Political 
Preferences); and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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TABLE 2 Impact of Policy Difference on Strength of Cleavage Voting, OLS 
Regression,1963–2008 † 
  Class voting ‡  Religious voting § 
  b s.e.  b s.e. 
Model 1 Constant  0.313 0.098  1.569 0.287 
 Left–right difference  0.003 0.011    
 Secular–religious difference    -0.146 0.102 
Adj. R2   0.01   0.17  
       
Model 2 Constant  0.407 0.038  1.952 0.074 
 Left–right difference  0.012* 0.004    
 Secular–religious difference    -0.052 0.025 
 Second Republic -0.429** 0.054  -1.358** 0.104 
Adj. R2   0.86   0.94  
 
Sources: Istituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica – Doxa, 1963 survey, Mass 
Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11, 1979; Four Nation 
Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES) 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; Party 
Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., Mapping Political 
Preferences);  and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
  
† The dependent variables are the log odds of voting centre-right (rather than centre-left) of middle class 
voters (respect to working class) and regular church-goers (respect to irregular/never church-goer) 
computed for each election between 1963 and 2008 
‡N = 13.  
§ N = 12 (religious attendance not available in the 1963 survey) 
 
* = p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
 
 41 
 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008
re
li
g
io
n
 (
lo
g
 o
d
d
s
)
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
m
o
ra
li
ty
 m
en
ti
o
n
s
 (
%
)
religion morality diff
 
 
Fig. 5.  Religious voting (log odds) and polarization of religious issues, 1968–2008 
 
Sources: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); 
Four Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 
2006, 2008; Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., 
Mapping Political Preferences); and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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Fig. 6.  Changing structure of party-organisational linkages: differences between MPs on left 
and centre-right associated to social cleavage group organizations, 1963–2008 (percentage of 
centre representatives minus percentage of left representatives) 
 
Source: CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study.  
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Fig. 7. Index of Net Difference of party–organization linkages, 1968–2008 
 
Source: CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
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Fig. 8. Log odds of secular middle-class (SMC) vs secular working-class voting centre/left and Index 
of Net Difference, 1968–2008 
 
Sources: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer , 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; 
CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
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Fig. 9.  Log odds of Catholic working-class (CWC) vs secular working-class voting centre/left and 
Index of Net Difference, 1968–2008 
 
Source: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; 
CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
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Fig. 10. Log odds of Catholic middle-class (CMC) vs secular working-class voting centre/left and 
Index of Net Difference, 1968–2008 
 
Source: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; 
CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
 47 
TABLE 3 Log Odds of Cleavage Voting and IND of Party–Organization Linkages, 1968–2008 (OLS 
Regression) 
 Secular middle-class 
(SMC) 
 Catholic working- 
class (CWC) 
  Catholic middle- 
class (CMC) 
 Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 
 b s.e.  b s.e.   b s.e. 
Constant 0.61   0.80    0.51  
IND -1.32 0.72  1.12*** 0.14   1.65*** 0.18 
          
Adj. R2 0.18   0.86    0.89  
       
 Model 4  Model 5   Model 6 
 b s.e.  b s.e.   b s.e. 
Constant -0.21   1.05    0.49  
IND 0.91 1.45  1.36*** 0.32   1.63*** 0.35 
1tY  1.01 0.59 
 -0.24 0.29   0.03 0.21 
          
Adj. R2 0.29   0.84    0.87  
Source: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; 
CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
 
Notes: N = 12; * Sig at 0.10 level; ** sig at 0.05 level; *** sig at 0.01 level. 
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TABLE 4 Cleavage Voting and Party–Organization Linkages Using Lagged Variables, 1968–2008 
(OLS Regression)  
 Model 1:  
Y = Log odds of cleavage 
voting 
 Model 2: 
Y = Log odds of cleavage 
voting  
 Model 3: 
Y = IND of party–org linkage 
 b s.e.  b s.e.  b s.e. 
Constant 0.19   0.16   -0.01  
1tCleavage  0.42** 0.12 
 0.48* 0.20  -0.02 0.10 
 IND 0.93*** 0.21       
1tIND    
 0.70* 0.32  0.91*** 0.17 
         
Adj. R2 0.82   0.74   0.79  
N         
         
 Model 4:  
Y = Log odds of cleavage 
voting 
 Model 5: 
Y = Log odds of cleavage 
voting  
 Model 6: 
Y = IND of party–org 
linkage 
 b s.e.  b s.e.  b s.e. 
Constant -0.07   -0.37   -0.32 0.17 
1tCleavage  0.43** 0.12 
 0.45* 0.19  -0.03 0.10 
 IND 0.87*** 0.21       
1tIND    
 0.68* 0.31  0.90*** 0.16 
1(%) tCHURCH  
0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01* 0.005 
         
Adj. R2 0.82   0.76   0.81  
N         
Source: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study, 1975; Eurobarometer, 11 (1979); Four 
Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; 
CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study. 
 
N = 30; * Sig at 0.05 level; ** sig at 0.01 level; *** sig at 0.001 level. 
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TABLE 5 Cleavage Voting, Party-Organization Linkages and Policy Polarization, 1968–2008 
(Logistic Regression) 
 Model 1   Model 2  
 b. s.e.  b. s.e. 
      
Constant -0.38   -0.38  
      
Individual level characteristics:      
  Secular Working-Class (SWC)       
  Secular Middle-Class (SMC) 0.19** 0.06  0.23*** 0.06 
  Cath Working-Class (CWC) 0.94*** 0.06  1.11*** 0.09 
  Cath Middle-Class (CMC) 0.75*** 0.07  0.81*** 0.09 
      
Cross-level interactions:      
Organizational linkage      
  IND x SMC 0.63** 0.23  1.12*** 0.26 
  IND x CWC 0.69*** 0.07  0.63*** 0.08 
  IND x CMC 1.02*** 0.09  0.99*** 0.09 
      
Policy polarization      
  Policy diff x SMC 
  Policy diff x CWC 
  Policy diff x CMC 
   -0.02*** 
-0.02** 
-0.006 
0.004 
0.007 
0.006 
      
-2LL 19388   19361  
Nagelkerke R2 0.10   0.10  
N 14,803   14,803  
Source: Mass Election Study 1968 and 1972; Political Action Study 1975; Four Nation Study 1985; Italian 
National Election Study (ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite 
Study. Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., Mapping 
Political Preferences); and CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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TABLE 6 Cleavage Voting, Party–Organization Linkages and Policy Polarization with Controls, 
1968–2008 (Logistic Regression) 
 Model 1   Model 2  
 b. s.e.  b. s.e. 
Constant -0.59     
      
Individual-level characteristics      
Social group (SWC REF)      
  Secular Middle-Class 0.24*** 0.07  -0.19 0.11 
  Catholic Working-Class 0.80*** 0.07  0.39*** 0.10 
  Catholic Middle-Class 0.71*** 0.08  0.12 0.11 
Sex (Male REF) 0.18*** 0.04  0.10 0.05 
Age (18–29 REF)      
  30–59 Years -0.10* 0.05  -0.07 0.06 
  60 or more 0.10 0.06  -0.10 0.09 
Education (Elementary REF)      
  Intermediate 0.25*** 0.05  0.15* 0.07 
  High School/College  -0.06 0.06  -0.23** 0.08 
Region (Secular North REF)      
  Catholic North  0.40*** 0.07  0.30*** 0.09 
  Red Zone -0.64*** 0.06  -0.49*** 0.08 
  Centre -0.01 0.06  -0.10 0.21 
  South 0.11 0.05  0.04 0.07 
Political Subculture (Socialist REF)      
  Catholic    1.85*** 0.08 
  Overlapped    0.81*** 0.08 
  Extraneous    1.37*** 0.07 
      
Cross-level interactions      
Party linkages      
  IND x SMC 0.73** 0.26  1.76*** 0.36 
  IND x CWC 0.76*** 0.08  0.94*** 0.11 
  IND x CMC 1.07*** 0.11  1.05*** 0.14 
      
-2LL 15882   9617  
Nagelkerke R2 0.13   0.23  
N 12,388   8037  
Source: Mass Election Study, 1968 and 1972; Four Nation Study, 1985; Italian National Election Study 
(ITANES), 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008; CIRCaP-Italian Political Elite Study; Party Manifesto 
Data from the Manifesto Research Group, 1963–2001 (see Budge et al., Mapping Political Preferences); and 
CIRCaP-Università di Siena, 2006 and 2008. 
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APPENDIX A Left–Right Positions and Secular-Religious Positions, Party Bloc and Party by Year, 
1963–2006 
 Centre-left bloc  Centre-right bloc 
Year Party Left– 
Right 
Secular– 
Religious 
 Party Left– 
Right 
Secular– 
Religious 
1963 PCI -12.8 -0.4  DC 1.3 6.5 
 PSI  -6.4 1.9  PRI -7.7 0.0 
     PSDI -3.3 0.0 
 Total -9.6 0.7  Total -3.2 2.2 
        
1968 PCI -4.1 -1.0  DC 0.2 3.3 
     PRI 7.7 -0.8 
     PSU -2.4 -3.3 
 Total -4.1 -1.0  Total 1.8 -0.2 
        
1972 PCI 1.7 -1.0  DC 5.8 3.6 
 PSI  -6.1 -2.2  PRI 4.0 -3.5 
     PSDI 0.8 0.0 
 Total -2.2 -1.6  Total 3.5 0.0 
        
1976 PCI 1.8 -4.1  DC 1.3 2.1 
 PSI  -2.0 -7.4  PRI 11.2 0.0 
 PR  0.0 -1.4  PSDI 4.8 -1.4 
 PdUP 2.3 0.0     
 Total 0.5 -3.2  Total 5.8 0.2 
        
1979 PCI 4.0 -0.7  DC -1.4 0.0 
 PSI  2.3 -2.7  PRI 2.0 0.4 
 PR  0.0 -0.7  PSDI 1.1 -1.1 
 PdUP 2.3 0.0     
 Total 2.1 -1.0  Total 0.6 -0.2 
        
1983 PCI -0.6 0.3  DC 5.0 0.5 
 PSI  4.2 0.8  PRI 4.3 1.2 
 PR  0.0 -0.7  PSDI 5.8 0.0 
 PdUP 2.3 0.0     
 DP -0.6 0.0     
 Total 1.1 0.1  Total 5.1 0.6 
        
1987 PCI -7.0 0.0  DC 3.1 4.5 
 PSI  4.6 1.1  PRI 5.1 0.0 
 PR  0.0 -0.7  PSDI 4.1 0.0 
 DP -0.6      
 Greens -8.1 -4.1     
 Total -2.2 -0.7  Total 4.1 1.5 
        
1992 PDS 2.2 0.0  DC 1.7 4.9 
 PSI  2.2 0.0  PRI 13.3 0.0 
 PR  0.0 -0.7  PSDI -3.1 0.0 
 Greens -3.3 0.0     
 RC -11.8 0.0     
 La Rete 0.0 5.7     
 Total -1.8 0.8  Total 3.9 1.6 
        
 52 
1994 PDS 18.6 0.0  FI 20.2 2.8 
 PSI  2.2 0.0  AN -2.0 6.1 
 PR  0.0 -0.7  LN -0.2 2.3 
 Greens -6.0 0.0     
 RC -9.2 0.0     
 La Rete 0.0 5.7     
 AD  17.2 0.0     
 Total 3.3 0.7  Total 6.0 3.7 
        
1996 PDS 5.6 1.9  FI 16.7 0.0 
 PR  0.0 0.0  AN 0.0 0.0 
 Greens -6.0 0.0  LN 5.6 0.0 
 RC -8.6 0.0     
 AD  1.7 9.7     
 Total -1.5 2.3  Total 7.4 0.0 
        
2001 PDS 4.1 0.3  FI 8.5 4.2 
 Girasole 4.1 0.3  AN 8.5 4.2 
        LN 8.5 4.2 
 Ulivo 4.1 0.3     
 Margherita 4.1 0.3     
 Euro. Democ. 1.3 1.9     
 RC -2.6 -2.0     
 Di Pietro -12.7 0.0     
 Total 0.8 0.2  Total 8.5 4.2 
        
2006 Unione -5.2 0.0  CDL 19.9 2.3 
        
2008 PD 12.1 -1.0  PDL 13.6 2.8 
 Italia dei Valori -2.3 -2.3  LN -14.6 4.6 
 Sinistra Arcobaleno -8.9 -3.4  La Destra -2.3 4.5 
 Total 0.3 -2.2  Total -1.1 4.0 
        
Notes: PCI = Communist Party ; PSI = Socialist Party; DC =  Christian Democrats; PRI = Republican Party; 
PSDI = Social Democratic Party; PSU = Unified Socialist Party; PdUP = United Proletarian Party; PR = Radical 
Party; DP = Proletarian Democracy; RC = Refounded Communism; AD = Democratic Alliance;  FI = Go Italy;  
AN = National Alliance; LN = Northern League; PDS = Democrats of the Left; CDL =  House of Freedom; PD 
= Democratic Party 
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